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The torture and murder of Italian PhD student Giulio Regeni in Egypt has reignited deep concerns
about the treatment of human rights in the Middle East. Andrea Lorenzo Capussela contrasts the
tragic event with another case just considered by the European Court of Human Rights: the
abduction in 2003 of the Egyptian Muslim cleric Abu Omar by the CIA in Milan, with the complicity of
Italian agents. He argues that the Italian government should now waive state-secrecy concerns and
allow its agents to be tried in order to encourage Egypt to show the same level of openness in the
Regeni case.
The Cambridge researcher Giulio Regeni, an Italian, was killed in Cairo. As Italy demanded justice, the Egyptian
authorities adamantly ruled out the involvement of their security services, but the autopsy conducted in Rome
reportedly proves that Regeni was tortured by professionals. Italy is now said to be considering tougher measures.
Recently the European Court of Human Rights adjudicated over a case which contains some similarities. It
condemned Italy for having denied justice to an Egyptian Muslim cleric, for whose abduction and torture Italy is
indirectly responsible. The details of this story make the contrast with Italy’s demands in Regeni’s case glaring, and
might help in explaining Egypt’s tacitly deﬁant response.
The cleric, Abu Omar, was kidnapped by the CIA in a
street in Milan, driven to a Nato air base near Venice,
and ﬂown to Egypt, where he was secluded,
interrogated, tortured, and abused for more than a
year. This happened in 2003, as part of the Bush
administration’s anti-terrorism policy. The case
prompted a broader investigation by the Council of
Europe, which unveiled many other ‘extraordinary
renditions’ on European soil.
Abu Omar’s disappearance was noticed because the
Milan prosecutors were already investigating him in
relation to terrorism. The CIA eﬀectively snatched
him from their hands. The outcome – which suggests
that these methods are hardly more eﬀective than
civilised criminal investigations, as a recent US
Senate report notes – is that the Milan courts
convicted Abu Omar for terrorism, and issued
sentences of between six and nine years to twenty-
six CIA agents, for having kidnapped him and
delivered him to his torturers.
This is incomplete justice. But this is the only case of extraordinary rendition – in Europe and, to my knowledge,
elsewhere – in which the perpetrators have been identiﬁed and judged. The reason is that ‘Italian magistrates are
ﬁercely independent and are not answerable to any government authority/entity, including the Minister of Justice… it
is nearly impossible to prevent them from undertaking action in Italy that they wish to carry out.’ This is what the US
embassy in Rome wrote to the State Department on 24 March 2005, in a cable (published by Wikileaks) which
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The current mayor of Milan, Giuliano Pisapia, holding a sign saying ‘Justice
for Giulio’. (Via Facebook)
discusses precisely the Abu Omar case.
Indeed, this can be read as a story about the separation of powers, or about the independence of Italy’s prosecutors
and the interactions between them and the legislative and executive powers. Unlike their peers in most countries, in
fact, Italian prosecutors are not just formally independent from the executive power, but are also independent from
higher magistrates, have direct control over the investigative police, and are bound to investigate all crimes they
learn of, with no discretion to drop charges on account of the raison d’état (the potential consequences, in this case,
on Italy’s foreign policy and security interests). Nowhere else in Europe do prosecutors have, jointly, the same
status, powers, and duties.
Such a degree of independence might seem unwise, especially from a realist perspective, and it may weaken
judicial accountability, as several examples regrettably suggest. But their independence is the main reason why, in
1992–94, prosecutors in Milan and elsewhere could put a whole political elite in the dock for corruption, provoking a
political transformation that remains unprecedented in Europe.
The results were disappointing, however. In the late 1990s systemic corruption gradually began to reassert itself ,
and the available indicators suggest that bribery is now considerably more widespread than on the eve of the 1992–
94 investigation. In parallel, in fact, the political system engaged in a long, dogged, and partly successful campaign –
which included both propaganda and legislative measures, was unwittingly aided by some judicial errors, and had its
peak during the 2000s – to clip the prosecutors’ wings, to avoid a repeat of that investigation.
This, therefore, is the context in which successive Italian governments had to confront a case that threatened to
embarrass both the security services and a rather important ally. A case, more precisely, that set the human rights of
a foreign potential terrorist directly against concrete security and foreign policy interests of the state.
Rome ﬁrst refused to ask Washington to extradite the
CIA agents, who remained at large and had to be
tried in absentia (which did not impair their rights of
defence: defended by lawyers of their own choosing,
they appealed their convictions up to the highest
court). Then Rome moved to save its own men too,
who could not run away: the head of the Italian secret
service, his deputy, and a few lesser agents, who had
been found guilty of having assisted the kidnapping.
By invoking state secrecy on several incriminating
documents, the government indirectly facilitated their
acquittal, as the remaining evidence was judged
insuﬃcient to merit a conviction.
Ironically, some of those documents had already
been leaked and published by the press. Of course,
the real secret that was being protected is the green
light that Italy’s secret service, and maybe the
government itself, had potentially given to the CIA.
Realists might retort that such a green light must
indeed be kept secret. Besides being illegal, however, that kidnapping was part of a misguided policy, whose
empirical and moral foundations have since crumbled: a policy, moreover, which in Italy’s constitutional setting
risked being unveiled and thrown publicly in the dock. Unwise realpolitik is, a realist might say, worse than a crime.
A farcical detail, moreover, is that one of the secret agents involved in the case – Renato Farina – was a journalist,
who negotiated a short prison sentence for having (clumsily) used his pen to lay false trails and disrupt the
investigation. A rather colourful ﬁgure, his story suggests also that Italy’s governance problems run deep: after his
2/3
second job was unveiled he continued to write op-eds for widely read newspapers, and in 2008 was elected to
parliament.
It must be highlighted, however, that Italian governments did not behave much diﬀerently from their European peers.
As part of an overview of Europe’s response to the extraordinary-renditions programme, for example, in September
2011 the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe declared that:
[t]he Swedish government misled a parliamentary committee that sought to clarify the facts and
furthermore gave erroneous information to a UN human rights body. Elsewhere, notably in Germany,
Italy and the United Kingdom, diplomatic or judicial decisions were taken to keep unwanted
revelations out of the public domain. State secrecy has been invoked as an obstacle to accountability.
It is Italy’s prosecutors, rather, that stand out among their European peers. Nonetheless, the judgement of the
European Court of Human Rights is deservedly harsh. For all governments in oﬃce between 2003 and 2013
misused the state-secrecy doctrine in order to deny justice to a man for whose torture Italy is indirectly responsible.
The court also notes that three of the CIA agents were pardoned by Italy’s Presidents – the incumbent and his
predecessor – despite the fact that they have never surrendered themselves.
What makes the two cases diﬀerent is that Regeni died. But a parallel remains possible, on the question of torture,
for human rights are universal. Italy demands justice in one case, but denied it in the other one. The country denied
justice when the victim was a foreigner and Italy guilty, and demands it when the victim is Italian and others are
responsible.
The current government is innocent, because it took oﬃce after the case ended. It should waive the state-secrecy
protection, allow its agents to be tried, and expect the same from Egypt. Its demands shall hardly be very credible
otherwise. And those demonstrating in Regeni’s name might wish also to remind Italy of this double-standard.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics. 
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